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Abstract 
There are five levels in social inquiry: ontology; epistemology; approaches; 
methodology; and methods, which we see as means of gathering information. There is 
no determinate relationship such that one school will consistently choose the same 
options all the way down. We can cross between what are often seen as competing 
world views, at various of these levels. Natural sciences have not arrived at a unified 
field theory and there is no reason why social sciences have to do so.  
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Discovering Pluralism 
As with many other social phenomena, scientific reflection is prompted by contingent 
events. In our case, this was the need to develop a methodological course for doctoral 
students coming to the European University Institute with different disciplinary 
backgrounds, national traditions and individual preferences. This, initially pragmatic, 
task stimulated us, although we had never thought of ourselves asmethodologists, to 
reflect more deeply on our methodological choices and those of our students. It was 
only towards the end of the (three years) preparation of our edited volume on 
Approaches and Methodologies in the Social Sciences (Della Porta and Keating, 
2008) (henceforth Approaches and Methodologies) that we started to use the term 
methodological pluralism to describe what we were doing. Adding A pluralistic 
perspective as subtitle of the volume— as a conscious but not yet fully worked-out 
choice—had the positive effect of forcing us to reflect more systematically about our 
central proposition. However, it also obliged us to explain more clearly what this 
really means and what it does not.The term pluralism has a positive normative charge 
but it is used in various ways and, if it is to be more than a liberal platitude, we need 
to delimitate more clearly our own conceptualization of the term.  
As we explain below, we see methodological pluralism in one sense as an 
empirical concept, pointing to the way that most science research occupies a broad 
middle-ground rather than conforming to the strict criteria postulated by the various 
competing schools. Most scholars work with nuanced assumptions and a moderate 
	   3	  
epistemological position and combine approaches in rather pragmatic ways. At the 
same time, methodological pluralism represents a normative view that in order for the 
social science to develop, we need to promote diversity, rather than a single way of 
doing things. Here, we go beyond relativism, as acknowledgment of the existence of 
different ways of doing things, and to stress what unites, instead than what divides the 
social sciences; unity, however comes from opening up the field rather than insisting 
on conformity to one model. 	   [Key	  Quote	  1	  about	  here]	  
 
Science Wars 
The social sciences are given to recurrent debates and disputes about 
approaches, methodologies and methods, which often take the form of a 
dichotomous contrast running between opposing world views. On each side 
we are presented with a pillar running from ontology, through epistemology 
and on to specific methods, with no possibility of crossing over to other pillar 
or mixing elements from each. For example, Marsh and Stoker (1995: 290) 
wrote that ‘…within the discipline there are authors utilising perspectives as 
diverse as rational choice theory and discourse analysis. The former operates 
from a positivist epistemological position and emphasises quantitative 
analysis; the latter operates from a relativist epistemological position and 
concentrates on qualitative analysis.’ By the third edition of their book, they 
presented a much more complex picture (Marsh and Stoker, 2010).  
We agree that the Manichean vision is misleading. We identified, in 
Approaches and Methodologies, five levels of social inquiry that need to be 
addressed, and at which differences are manifested. The most basic is 
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ontology, what the social world consists of, how far concepts correspond to 
real phenomena and what are the building blocks of analysis. The second is 
epistemology, of how we can know about the world. The third is approaches, 
schemes of analysis often based on assumptions about relationships, for 
example between rational-choice, actor-based approaches and culturalist or 
socio-biological approaches. The fourth is methodology, the way in which we 
operationalise our concepts and choose to analyse them. The fifth is methods, 
which we see as means of gathering information. While there is a close 
connection among these levels, we argued that there is no determinate 
relationship such that one school will consistently choose the same options all 
the way down. We therefore deny a necessary progress from a specific 
ontology  epistemology  approach  methodology  method. 
The argument that social sciences must have a consistent set of ontologies and 
epistemologies owes a lot to the natural sciences, where knowledge is seen as 
consistent and cumulative. It is assumed in this analogy that science is about 
generating theories that reflect as accurately as possible the material world. Ironically, 
the natural sciences themselves can go for a long time without agreement on some of 
the fundamental building blocks of knowledge. Physics has two quite different 
conceptions of light, which are used as appropriate to answer questions or to explain 
different phenomena. Scientists might aspire to a unified or field theory that would 
resolve the conflict between relativity and quantum mechanics but this does not stop 
them from doing good science in the meantime; and it may be that the conflict will 
never be resolved. Nor does science always insist on an identity between theory and 
material reality; theories rather are often ways of understanding the hidden 
dimensions of phenomena not amenable to positivist description (which now seems to 
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amount to most of the universe). Science proceeds rather by conceptualisation and 
both concepts and units of analysis depend on the question we are asking. As Rescher 
(1993: 41) notes: ‘There is no simple, unique, ideally adequate concept-framework for 
“describing the world.” The botanist, horticulturalist, landscape gardener and painter 
will operate from diverse cognitive “points of view” to describe the self-same garden.’ 
If this is so in relation to the natural world, it is even more so in the social 
domain. This is because, even more than in the natural sciences, we are relying on 
concepts at a high level of abstraction. Only if we insist on a one-to-one 
correspondence between concepts and a concrete social world can we insist that our 
concepts are correct and other people’s are wrong (Kratochwil, 2008). Indeed even 
most positivist social scientists will admit that social science works with concepts and 
abstractions that should not be ‘reified’; but some of them nonetheless insist that there 
must be a single grid of concepts, usable for all purposes (Sartori, 2009).  
Going beyond the epistemological level, choices have to be made throughout 
the research process, which are not always easy to align on one easily defined 
cleavage such as positivists versus interpretivism, and even less quantitative versus 
qualitative methods. There is, that is, not just one choice (and one Methodenstreit), 
but a plurality of choices and tensions. The presence of multiple points of contention 
makes dialogues between different positions, to a certain extent, easier. As pluralist 
approaches to group politics contend, overlapping conflicts also mean overlapping 
membership, and therefore blurred, permeable boundaries. Moreover, none of the 
issues of disagreement can be defined as a dichotomous choice, being rather 
continuum. Social science owes much both to natural science and to the humanities 
and indeed has developed as a ‘third way’ between then. It thus has the possibility of 
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borrowing from one or the other or from both without having to confine itself to the 
epistemology or methods of either.  
 
Beyond Dichotomies 
Epistemological questions traditionally pits positivist versus interpretivist 
(hermeneutic) views, often linked with ontological assumptions about the existence of 
a physical world or the reality of the social world. In practice, assumptions about how 
we can capture the reality – and how much of it– vary in more subtle ways. Few 
believe that social scientists are able easily to get hold of the external reality, but few 
believe that a reality does not exist at all. Positivist researchers recognise the 
importance of concepts and theories as filters between the external reality and our 
knowledge of it, and the need to avoid reifying them. Constructivists do not abandon 
the search for some inter-subjective knowledge, however contextual and contested. 
The focus on either the external reality or the subjective perception of it is a matter of 
degree, and often changes as we move from a research project to the next, or even as 
we report on our research. Critical realism provides an intuitively plausible middle 
ground that has now been given a rigorous intellectual justification (Bhaskar, 2002). 
[Key Quote 2 about here] 
The same can be said of the division on the search for generalisable knowledge 
versus the understanding of specific case, or for explanation versus understanding. 
Even though the various epistemological positions differ on their assumptions about 
social science’s capacity to develop covering laws, most researchers combine, in a 
Gramscian way, pessimism of the reason with optimism of the will; they express 
some scepticism about our capacity to build general laws (and so test and test again 
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the results of previous research), but also some hope that research on specific cases 
can produce results that are useful also to understand other cases. 
Beyond the shifting balance between generalisable and contextual knowledge 
(often solved with the search for historically specific but generalisable knowledge) 
preferences vary on the means to achieve it. The debates between inductive 
construction of theories versus deductive verification/falsification of them cuts across 
positivists as well as constructivists. Indeed, the distinction itself can be exaggerated. 
What is often described as the deductive approach, starting with a theory and testing it 
empirically, is not truly deductive, since deduction proceeds entirely by reasoning 
from premises. It is better described as the hypothetico-deductive approach or 
deductive/empirical approach, combining both pure theory and empirical work. Even 
the ‘deductive’ part of this is rarely truly deductive in practice. Rather, the initial 
hypotheses are constructed on the basis of previous research in a rather inductive 
manner. On the other hand, more directly inductive research usually starts from 
theoretical questions and produces new ones, without each time throwing away the 
results of previous work in order to start from the beginning. Grounded theory has 
long sought a middle way here (Glaser and Strauss, 1999), although it now covers a 
broad field, with some its exponents more insistent on universalisation than others. As 
Howard S. Becker observed long ago, challenging the idea that quantitative and 
qualitative research each has its distinct epistemological assumptions : ‘(the) two 
styles of works do place differing emphasis on the understanding of specific of 
historical or ethnographic cases as opposed to general laws of social interaction. But 
the two styles also imply one another. Every analysis of a case rests, explicitly or 
implicitly, on some general laws, and every general law supposes that the 
investigation of particular cases would show that law at work’ (Becker, 1996: 53-54.)  
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Moving to methods, the traditional sharp distinction between qualitative and 
quantitative methods can be questioned. Quantitative methods require qualitative 
observations at various points; and qualitative analysis often refers to quantities in 
attempts to support the validity of its arguments. Mixed-method strategies combining 
large and small N and triangulation of different methods are rarely opposed in 
principle, even though not often applied in practice. The identification of positivist 
epistemology with quantitative methods on the one hand, and interpretativist 
epistemology with qualitative methods on the other, hides as much as it reveals. While 
ethnography and qualitative methods are primarily about the way subjects construct 
their world-views, they also have a strong orientation to the knowledge of the external 
reality. On the other hand, quantitative methods are also used to investigate subjective 
perceptions. Discourse analysis, even in its more subjectivist forms, may use 
quantitative techniques. Theory (method) driven versus field (problem) driven 
strategies divide ethnographers as well as quantitative researchers. 
We can continue to map disagreements that cut across the traditional 
epistemological and methodological divides. Scholars disagree on the best units of 
analysis of their research. Ontological individualists insist that only individuals exist, 
but this is to confuse real existence with the conceptual categories of research. 
Individuals exist in a physical sense but that does not mean that conceptual categories 
beyond the individual are not important. Methodological individualists prefer 
individuals as the units of analysis on the basis of the assumption that only individuals 
can act. Others instead take social interactions and/or complex institutions as the 
constitutive units of their disciplines. Here as well, however, there is space for 
combinations of units of analysis in multilevel designs in both qualitative as well as 
quantitative research. Indeed, much survey research uses individuals as units of 
	   9	  
observation and analysis but invokes characteristics at a higher level of analysis, such 
as social class, as the explanatory variables; that is there is not a necessary 
correspondence between the units of analysis and the level of analysis, which is a 
theoretical question. The choice of individual or collectivity depends once again on 
the question being asked. Similarly the age-old conflict between structure and agency 
cuts across other divisions. Beliefs in the supreme explanatory capacity of economic 
structures versus values or interest versus norms have kept alive most disputes in the 
social science beyond epistemological or methodological boundaries. 
Nor is social science cumulative. Consider what the American political 
scientists do with their ‘bringing in back in’ debates. These typically involve a search 
for a parsimonious theory of social action that could unify or define the field; 
behaviourism and rational choice in their time are examples. Then political scientists 
observe that their theories are either explaining less and less about phenomena, or 
depend on ever more stringent assumptions (or both) and seek to round them out. 
They do this by re-inventing old concepts while seeking to subject them to much the 
same logic as their existing models. The result is a reincorporation of ideas from 
adjacent fields or disciplines but while losing the richness of the concepts themselves. 
So we had the state brought back in during the 1980s without an appreciation of the 
strong historical and normative connotations of the term. History was brought back 
without sufficient appreciation of the subtleties and traps of historiography or the way 
in which the past does not merely influence the present; the present influences our 
accounts and understandings of the past. Ideas are brought back, but as a separate 
variable, their weight balanced against that of interests as though they were 
analytically and practically distinct. Norms and values are brought back without 
drawing on the rich tradition of cultural analysis in Weberian sociology. Culture, 
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which is essentially an inter-subjective concept, based on relationships among people, 
is brought back reduced to an individual-level characteristic so as to fit the prevailing 
positivist and individualist paradigm (although we have just noticed an effort to ‘bring 
back in’ Weberian notions of culture in Hall and Lamont, 2009). 
 [Key Quote 3 about here] 
Faced with this complexity, the forced nature of the binary choices often 
presented and the existence in research practice of a large middle ground, we made a 
plea in Approaches and Methodologies for a pluralist perspective, combining different 
methods as appropriate for the problem under investigation.  
 
Towards Pluralism 
Our pluralist proposal goes, however, beyond the observation of a plurality of 
methodological cleavages and the denial of the presence of one best way to 
knowledge. We also plea for a principled  pluralism.  
There are those who think that their own approach is right and that everyone 
should conform to it. Others think that they have the one right way but realize that it is 
not shared by everyone and they might even be in the minority, so others must be 
accommodated; these are the pragmatic pluralists. In Caterino and Schram’s definition 
(2006: 4), the current state in political science is characterized as a constrained 
pluralism, that is ‘a partial hegemony that limits methodological diversity’. This may 
take the form of liberal tolerance or what in the Cold War was known as peaceful co-
existence. It may also take the form of a provisional pluralism in which the existence 
of a diversity of points of view can be considered to enrich the discipline but then 
provide a market in which truth will drive out error. So eventually pluralism will give 
way to received truth. This might be considered analogous to the natural sciences, 
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were it not for the fact, as noted above, that the natural sciences last for a long time 
with competing theories. Then there are those who think that pluralism can be 
justified it itself; these are the principled pluralists, among whom we placed ourselves.  
Principled pluralism,is more than the observation of the dilemma between 
complexity and parsimony and the varied approaches that it produces. Nor is it a 
matter of accepting the legitimacy of distinct and self-contained schools which, for 
practical reasons cannot be reconciled and which we must, as liberals, tolerate even 
where disagreeing with them. It is not merely a matter of humbly accepting the limits 
to knowledge. On the contrary, it is something positive. We argue for pluralism at a 
deep level and as an enduring feature of the social sciences.  
This conception of pluralism is consistent with seeing the social sciences not as 
a single, cumulative enterprise but as a complex field (Steinmetz, 2005).A pluralist 
vision involves some assumptions about the ways in which disciplines are perceived 
and in the narrative of their evolution. In this sense, it is not (only) normative, but also 
reflect on the existing plurality of ontologies, epistemologies, methodologies (not to 
speak of methods). There are multiple points of connection, comparison and mutual 
learning, which cannot be systematized or placed within exclusive schools and pillars. 
So methodological pluralism recognizes that, in the development of the social 
sciences, a plurality of points of view not only have coexisted, but also have been 
often in dialogue with each other. In the actual development of research and 
theorization in the social science, the image that methods and methodologies derive 
directly from prior epistemological or even ontological positions is misleading. Most 
of the time, these choices are made for more contingent and pragmatic reasons. The 
availability of data sets as well as the need to compare different contexts can push 
towards the use of more or less sophisticated statistical analysis. Collaborations 
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among scholars with different methodological skills and experiences in problem-
driven research projects favour triangulation of methods. The state-of-the art in one 
subfield can push others towards quantitative, qualitative or mixed methods to make 
research more interesting. Availability of research funds as well as individual skills of 
course also play a role in the methodological choices. Attention to micro-meso-
macrolinks and causal mechanisms often pushes towards combinations on different 
units of analysis and related theories (from structuralism to symbolic 
interactionism).Epistemological preferences are therefore often constructed ‘in 
action’, and/or remain implicit in a research design as well as in the construction of a 
scholar’s professional identity. 
[Key Quote 4 about here] 
A methodologically pluralist approach does not accept the teleological or linear 
narrative of institutionalization and paradigm consolidation. It thus avoids the 
circularity of continually re-introducing concepts in an illusory pursuit of 
completeness. Progress represents, rather, a dialectical process of challenge, 
incorporation and adaptation. Concepts borrowed from adjacent disciplines are not 
stripped down or adapted to the existing paradigm but taken seriously in their 
complexity. Of course, if we brought back in everything that might be relevant, we 
would be overwhelmed by complexity and defeat the purpose of the exercise, which is 
to gain some analytical leverage. Social knowledge must then by definition be partial 
and the search for a parsimonious and unified theory is an illusion. 
Lastly, let us make clear what pluralism is not. It is not a matter merely of 
accepting the legitimacy of distinct and self-contained schools which, for practical 
reasons cannot be reconciled and which we must, as liberals, tolerate even where 
disagreeing with them. Nor is it merely a matter of humbly accepting the limits to 
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knowledge. Pluralism does not entail a hybridity or synthesis in which differences 
disappear or purely pragmatic compromises are made. On the contrary, it is something 
positive at a rather deeper level and as an enduring feature of the social sciences. 
Pluralism does not develop from pillarization. We can draw by a parallel here 
between methodological pluralism and social and cultural pluralism in contemporary 
liberal theory. Here the existence of distinct cultures is seen not as a problem but an 
asset, enriching the experience of society and individuals. For this, it is necessary that 
the diverse cultures not be sealed from each other but interact; but the condition for 
this is that they themselves be maintained rather than dissolving into the melting pot. 
There may be syntheses of different approaches and some may be transformed 
radically, but the aim is not the creation of a unified theory; since we argue that such a 
theory is impossible, any effort to do so would stifle the development of the 
discipline. Pluralism emphatically does not entail a relativism or indifference, in 
which any approach must be considered as good as any other, with no basis for 
choosing between them; rather they must challenge each other and defend themselves 
on the basis of their utility for answering the questions that they pose. A nihilism that 
contends that questions cannot be answered does not meet this requirement any more 
than does an insistence on the strict canons of positivism.  
 
A European approach? 
It would contradict our central argument to advocate a single European political 
science or to identify some essential items to distinguish it from the American variety. 
Yet the European context is important. Exponents of rational choice, of 
constructivism or of historical institutionalism are much the same on both sides of the 
Atlantic. In Europe, however, there is a greater plurality of approaches. National 
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intellectual traditions are multiple, and there is less of a tendency for one approach to 
dominate at any time or in any institution. As with the European project itself, 
different perspectives and expectations must live together in greater or lesser harmony 
without a shared telos.  
Speaking of national traditions risks reifying them and suggesting a uniformity 
that does not exist, yet certain ideas continue to be stressed in particular countries, as 
do specific approaches. For example, the concept of the state has a meaning in France 
and Germany that is difficult to convey in the United States or the United Kingdom. 
By contrast, American scholars, while downplaying the concept of the state in 
domestic politics, often give it supreme importance in international relations. French 
social science traditionally tends to an abstraction that contrasts with the empiricism 
of the English-speaking world. As emerging disciplines in the late nineteenth and 
early twentieth centuries, political science and sociology were linked in some 
countries to the older disciplines of history and law and these legacies are still visible. 
In many countries, international relations emerged as a discipline separate from 
comparative politics. The division between political science and sociology is sharper 
in the United Kingdom and the United States than in France or Italy. Sometimes these 
contrasts reflect differences in the political and social realities of the countries 
concerned. France has traditionally had a strong state. American politics has revolved 
around interest-group pluralism within a rather narrowly defined value system (at 
least until the revival of the religious cleavage). Yet the difference in intellectual 
emphasis does not always reflect an underlying social reality, as opposed to different 
ways of thinking about politics and society. There is thus great value in taking the 
concepts and ideas from one country and seeking to apply them comparatively, and 
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more generally in seeking concepts that travel, both as an aid to comparative research 
and as an antidote to methodological nationalism.  
[Key Quote 5 about here] 
There has always been an international market in ideas, peaking at times such as 
the Renaissance or the eighteenth-century Enlightenment; but since the twentieth 
century, this has greatly intensified. The existence of a common language, 
successively Latin, French and English, encourages this, but itself may shape the ideas 
and their reception. For our purposes, two arenas are important: the market of ideas 
within Europe, and transatlantic trade as the United States has ascended to a dominant 
position within the social science research world. For example, the ‘behavioural 
revolution’ in the 1960s was American in origin but powerfully affected European 
thinking from the 1970s onwards, emphasizing universalism, quantification and 
rigour. Rational choice theory, so influential from the 1980s, was not an American 
monopoly but was strongest there and was powerfully aided by the strength of US 
social science in the global market. Other ideas have more complex histories. 
Organizational analysis was imported from the United States in the 1950s by Michel 
Crozier and others, who transformed it into a particularly French form of science, the 
‘sociology of organizations’. This in turn was taken up by British scholars and 
brought back into the English-speaking world. Here it encountered the ‘new 
institutionalism’, which had been working with similar ideas, starting from a different 
basis, as a reaction to behaviourism and rational choice. European sociology was 
influenced by American approaches, but also developed and then diffused new ideas 
of its own. Among others, French sociologist Alain Touraine was influenced by 
Parsonian functionalism when developing his theory of society, and European ethno-
methodologists by Erwin Goffman. In all these fields, ideas developed by European 
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scholars travelled to the other side of the Atlantic, with particularly strong impacts on 
theorization and research on such issues as power (Foucault), communication 
(Habermas), culture (Bourdieu). 
It would be deeply unfortunate if this process of learning and mutual influence 
were to be put at risk by the search for a unified European political science in the 
belief that only with our own paradigm can we survive in global competition.  
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own conceptualization of the term’ 
 
‘Even though the various epistemological positions differ on their assumptions about 
social science’s capacity to develop covering laws, most researchers combine, in a 
Gramscian way, pessimism of the reason with optimism of the will’ 
 
‘The identification of positivist epistemology with quantitative methods on the one 
hand, and interpretativist epistemology with qualitative methods on the other, hides as 
much as it reveals’ 
 
‘In the actual development of research and theorization in the social science, the 
image that methods and methodologies derive directly from prior epistemological or 
even ontological positions is misleading’ 
 
‘It would contradict our central argument to advocate a single European political 
science or to identify some essential items to distinguish it from the American variety. 
Yet the European context is important.’ 
